A TOAST
BENJAMIN KAPLANt

You know and I know that if I qualify at all for this assignment of
making a toast, of lighting a bonfire in celebration of the Federal
Rules, it is because, and only because, I am the oldest character extant
in these parts. So I am reminded of that noble lord who, on receiving
the news that he had been named to the Order of the Garter, said:
"Bully! No damn nonsense about merit!"
It is no merit of mine that I actually practiced law in New York
for several years before 1938. Thus, I can testify personally about the
before and the after, which you youngsters cannot. In the before, the
centerpiece of procedure in the New York courts, state and federal, was
the New York Civil Practice Act (the "CPA"). Jack Weinstein had not
turned the CPA upside down yet. It stood then in hundreds of sections.
It was an arcanum, understood by few and admired by none. Like
Winston Churchill's tapioca pudding, it had no theme. In the hands of
the canny, it lent itself to nearly infinite protraction of litigation, and I
recall so well the chief trial man in our firm, a saturnine fellow with no
heart at all, who was a conjurer with all the tricks.
Here comes the after, or "how the Federal Rules burst in on me."
I had filed an unfair competition case in the Southern District court,
and lo!, within a matter of weeks I, or rather my plaintiff client, was
hit by the brand new deposition upon oral examination. It was conducted-of all places-in the downtown office of the defendant's counsel. After one day's athletic interrogation, my client's zeal for combat
was dampened considerably. Mine was too and we settled the case very
promptly, not much to our advantage. I was impressed. Some later
practical experiences with the Rules deepened the impression. I remain
impressed to this day.
Let us acknowledge that, viewed in their historic setting, the
Rules, under the aegis of the Rules Enabling Act, were a positive
achievement of the first magnitude. They lifted civil procedure to a fundamentally new and much improved level. Here was a national procedure, a procedure single yet internally multifarious and pliant, conceived in a functional way, with a minimum of anachronistic oddities.
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Need I recite: union of law and equity, simplified pleading, revision of
the party- and claim-structure of litigation, machinery for pre-trial
gathering of information, pre-trial conference, summary judgment, abolition of penalties for technical missteps, or other harmless errors. And
by a feat of draftsmanship, the whole system was set forth in no more
than eighty-odd rules.
Charles Edward Clark, the chief draftsman, had no mean opinion
of his own work. In 1963 he wrote that "the success of the federal
system is nothing short of phenomenal" and that "[n]o criticism of major character now appears."' There was, indeed, general acceptance
well through the 1960s: the federal citadel stood, and there had been
much emulation among the states.
Inevitably, that picture changed. The tempest over the rules of evidence might have led to a fatal change in Congress' relation to judicial
rulemaking. So far it has not done so; rather it has inspired some useful
thinking about how the rulemaking process should be conducted, from
the Advisory Committees through to the Supreme Court.
Over the past two decades, however, vast changes have occurred in
the volume and character of the cases falling to federal courts, and
changes, too, in the composition, economics, practices, and psychology
of the legal profession. Statute and common-law changes have spawned
rights and defenses to rights in numbers and ways unimaginable by the
solons of the 1930s. These developments have put severe challenges to
the Rules. In the new environment, broad discovery combines with
loose pleading, extensible party- and claim-structure, and other basic
features of the Rules to create potentials for delaying the finish and
increasing the costs of litigation. Fiercely contentious lawyers have not
ignored these opportunities. Overuse and misuse of Rules devices must
skew the substantive results of the cases in directions of injustice.
The responses to these troubles by means of particular rule
amendments by no means have guaranteed a cure. We recently have
had some amendments that depart a little from the usual: first, piling
on sanctions against parties and lawyers for the perversion of procedures; second, drawing judges further into the close management of
cases and engaging them actively in pursuit of settlement and other
shortcuts. The first expedient has yet to prove itself as a means of
changing habituated conduct; the second, acknowledging an existing reality, confirms and encourages the modification of judges' sanctified
patterns of behavior and thought, with consequences hard to foresee or
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appreciate.
Actually there is lots of buzzing activity in the world of civil procedure having only a loose relation to the Rules: local rules, manuals,
standard operating procedures, standing orders, and other abracadabra
which in effect write elaborate (and frequently confusing) addenda to
the Rules; a population of magistrates, special masters, and yet others
who weave their own webs. The whole leaves wide room for discretion
and thus is beset with fears of arbitrary and unequal decisions. We
hear attacks on "loose texture" in all its forms, and advocacy of more
defined procedural modes that truly will regulate conduct down the
line.
In the year 1988 the trans-substantive premise of the Rules is not
only questioned, but considered already overborne by the facts of life in
the courts; what is supposed to emerge is diversified procedures, well
defined, organized on functional lines, whether the categories arrange
themselves according to substantive law differences or other indicators.
Then we have proposals, or rather cries of the heart: for the perfection
of skills to tell us how quarrels arise and thus how and where to dispose of them; for better equalization of forensic opportunities between
the litigants strong and weak (meaning often, but not always, the
"Haves" and "Have-Nots"); for a rational or scientific approach which
will assure that settlements are made on terms not grievously unfair;
for the education of lawyers to recognize and better serve the social or
public ends of litigation.
In a period of reconnoiter and reassessment, expect a whiff of revisionism and, sure enough, I have heard lately some kind words for the
late Senator Thomas J. Walsh, the arch-enemy of an Enabling Act and
of national rules. Possibly this phenomenon is inspired by card-carrying
members of the ACLU or, worse still, liberals. But in any sober view, I
submit that the fifty years of the Federal Rules must be accounted a
good show, as human governance goes. Certainly so, I think, in their
early career, especially when set by the side of the CPAs they superseded. For more recent years we can say the Rules adapted reasonably
well, if not perfectly, to vastly altered conditions. They have worked to
considerable (if not universal) satisfaction to support revolutions of the
substantive law. The much criticized discovery function and class action
remain together the scourge of corporate and governmental malefactors.
Some fundamental faults of litigation procedure-for example, the
handicapping of the weak, despite statutory help for them here and
there-should be attributed not to the Rules, but rather to the state of
the nation, the climate in the big outdoors. Recall the dictum of the
Italian master Piero Calamandrei that court procedure reflects the soci-
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ety which it inhabits as a drop of water reflects the sky.
What portends, what will happen in the next fifty years, knows
God, although even that is doubtful. What is not doubtful is that some
generations hence there will be a symposium at Northeastern Law
School celebrating and also lamenting what did happen.
Now I have done what is meet. I have steered a middle course, as
the wag says, between partiality and impartiality, and I propose to end
on the upbeat, as, of course, you expect me to do. I light the bonfire
and, please, let none of you throw the Rules or parts of them into the
fire. Let us cheer the Rules and Charles Clark, William Mitchell, Homer Cummings, and others who helped in the creation, but, in a spirit
of generosity and bonhomie, let us not omit Senator Walsh and his
allies. The Rules emerged as a vector of many forces pushing and pulling in different directions. Perhaps Walsh and company were a necessary element in the mix. Let us celebrate all those, including ourselves,
who over the years have taken an intelligent interest in that baffling
and beautiful subject of civil procedure. And so, drink up!

